Gentrice
Technical White Paperv1.0 · 2026-05Public Document

Data Loss Prevention for Agentic AI Environments

This document describes Gentrice's multi-layer DLP architecture for agentic AI systems — covering detection mechanisms, rule categories, action policies, and compliance mapping. Intended for both technical evaluators and procurement compliance personnel.

Issued by
Gentrice 顯赫資訊
Version
1.0
Date
2026-05
Classification
Public
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Executive Summary

The autonomous execution capabilities of agentic AI systems create data exfiltration risks far exceeding those of traditional Q&A AI. Agents can invoke tools, read and write databases, and generate documents without human intervention — every step a potential exfiltration node. This document describes Gentrice's five-tier progressive DLP system, designed for on-premises and air-gapped deployment, validated in government and enterprise environments. It achieves comprehensive detection and action on PII, classified content, prompt injection, and sensitive output — with minimal latency impact.

Detection Accuracy
97–100%
Across OWASP Agentic Top 10
Tier 0–2 Response Time
< 5 ms
Zero perceived latency at high throughput
Coverage Tiers
5
Blacklist to LLM-as-Judge
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Background: The DLP Challenge of Agentic AI

Traditional DLP systems were designed for static data flows — a user uploads a file, the system scans it, and decides whether to allow it. Agentic AI breaks this assumption: agents executing a task may make dozens of tool calls within milliseconds, each carrying different data types in and out.

Traditional AI Data Flow

  • User → single request → LLM → single output
  • Predictable data flow with clear boundaries
  • Static rules cover most risks

Agentic AI Data Flow

  • Goal → multi-step planning → tool call chain → multi-source data synthesis → output
  • Every tool call is a potential data I/O node
  • Attackers can hijack agent behavior via prompt injection

Agentic AI also faces attack vectors traditional systems never encountered — prompt injection lets malicious users control agent behavior through input content, context exfiltration can steal system prompts and API keys, and tool poisoning can make agents execute malicious tool responses. These threats require DLP not just at the entry point, but throughout the entire agent execution pipeline.

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Five-Tier Progressive Detection Architecture

We follow a 'speed-first, precision-increasing' design principle — fast rules intercept clear threats in milliseconds, while slow but precise models activate only when necessary. This keeps the system operational at high throughput (e.g., concurrent multi-user government deployments).

Tier 0–1< 1 msInvariant Rules & Blacklist Lookup

System-level hard constraints that no request can bypass. Includes a keyword blacklist of absolutely prohibited patterns and invariant rules that block on format mismatch. Latency is negligible with zero UX impact.

Tier 2< 5 msRegex Structural Pattern Matching

Regex matching against known sensitive data formats: Taiwan national ID ([A-Z][12]\d{8}), unified business number (\d{8}), mobile numbers, credit card numbers, and more. Highest throughput for PII protection at scale.

Tier 2.5< 50 msEmbedding Semantic Similarity Matching

For requests that deliberately rephrase or obfuscate to bypass regex, embedding models compute semantic similarity. Detects variants of 'ignore previous instructions' regardless of spelling or word order variations.

Tier 3< 200 msBehavioral Anomaly Detection

Cross-request behavioral analysis: a user issuing a high volume of sensitive data queries in a short window, request patterns deviating from normal baselines, or systematic probing of DLP boundaries — all flagged as anomalous.

Tier 4< 2 sLLM-as-Judge Semantic Analysis

For requests flagged as high-risk but not conclusive by earlier tiers, a local LLM (e.g. Gemma 4) acts as judge for deep semantic analysis. This tier offers the highest flexibility — techniques such as KV caching can improve response speed — but is still triggered only when necessary to preserve throughput.

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Detection Categories & Rules

DLP rules are organized into four categories by data type and threat nature. Each rule specifies its detection tier, matching pattern, and recommended action.

Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

RulePatternTier
Taiwan National ID[A-Z][12]\d{8}Tier 2
Unified Business Number\d{8}Tier 2
Phone Numbers09\d{8} / 0[2-8]\d{7,8}Tier 2
Credit Card Number\d{4}[- ]?\d{4}[- ]?\d{4}[- ]?\d{4}Tier 2
Email Address[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+Tier 2

Confidential & Access Control

RulePatternTier
Classified Document Keywords上下文語意Tier 2.5
External Org Confidentiality上下文語意Tier 2.5
Internal Credential PatternsRegex + Tier 2.5Tier 2 / 2.5

Prompt Injection Attacks

RulePatternTier
Instruction override (ignore prev)Regex + EmbeddingTier 2 / 2.5
Jailbreak (DAN / JAILBREAK)黑名單 + EmbeddingTier 0–1 / 2.5
Encoded attacks (Base64/ROT/Unicode)解碼後比對Tier 2
Role-play bypassLLM-as-JudgeTier 4

Output Filtering

RulePatternTier
Auto-mask PII in LLM outputRegex post-outputTier 2
Block output containing classified content上下文語意Tier 2.5
Credential detection in code outputRegex + Tier 2.5Tier 2 / 2.5
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Detection Direction & Action Policy

DLP operates in two directions: input detection (pre-input) scans before the request reaches the LLM; output detection (post-output) filters after the LLM responds. Each rule independently specifies its direction and the action to take on trigger.

L1 Pre-Input
Before request enters LLM
L2 Context Analysis
Cross-turn semantic scan
L3 Post-Output
After LLM response
Blockblock

Fully reject the request without forwarding to the LLM. For high-certainty, severe-risk events such as confirmed ID number exfiltration or jailbreak attempts.

Warnwarn

Allow the request to proceed but log the event and notify administrators in real time. For borderline cases requiring human review, such as semantically ambiguous confidential queries.

Maskmask

Preserve request or output structure but replace sensitive fields with placeholders (e.g. [MASKED-ID]). Users still receive partial responses while raw sensitive values are prevented from entering LLM context or external systems.

Redirect to Localredirect

Route the request to an on-premises deployed model instead of a cloud model. For requests containing sensitive content that still requires processing — data stays within organizational boundaries while service availability is maintained.

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Management Console

The following is an actual screenshot of the DLP management console, showing the event inbox (with trace IDs, detection tier, and action result), event trend charts, and protection rule configuration. Administrators can view all DLP events in real time and adjust rule settings through the interface.

Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Management Console
DLP management console screenshot
Trace ID per Event

Every event has a unique TRC-YYYYMMDD-XXXXXXXX trace code for audit queries

Detection Tier Label

Events label the triggering tier (pre_input / post_output / semantic) for analysis

Action Visualization

Event trend chart uses color to distinguish Block (red), Warn (orange), Mask (blue) for instant risk situational awareness

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Compliance Mapping

This DLP architecture covers Taiwan's major information security regulations and international AI security standards. The following maps each regulation to relevant provisions and system coverage.

Regulation / StandardScopeArticle / RequirementSystem Coverage
Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA)TaiwanArt. 27: Appropriate security measures to prevent PII leakageTier 2 PII detection, masking, audit logs
Cybersecurity Management ActTaiwan Government AgenciesArt. 16: Access control and audit mechanisms requiredRBAC, full audit trail, trace IDs
OWASP Agentic AI Top 10International Standard10/10 category coverage: Prompt Injection, Context Exfiltration, Tool Poisoning, etc.Tier 0–4 full coverage, including Agent Threat Rules ruleset
Healthcare Data Security RegulationsHealthcare ProvidersMedical records and diagnostic info must not be transmitted to unauthorized systemsBidirectional input/output detection, redirect-to-local action
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Deployment Model

The DLP engine is deployed as a microservice, embedded in the LLM request routing middleware layer. All components run within the client's physical environment with no external network connections required.

User Request
Any user sends a request via UI or API
DLP Engine Intercept (pre-input)
Tiers 0–4 scan sequentially; determine action (pass / block / mask / redirect)
LLM Router
Passed requests are routed to local or cloud models per RBAC and model policy
DLP Engine Filter (post-output)
LLM response scanned again before returning to user, ensuring output contains no sensitive data
Audit Log Write
All events (including passes) written to tamper-proof audit log with unique trace IDs

LDAP / AD Integration

DLP events are bound to user identity; audit logs trace back to specific operators.

DLP Rule Assistant

Built-in AI-assisted rule authoring — administrators describe requirements in natural language; the system auto-generates regex or semantic rules.

Need a DLP Assessment for Your Environment?

Our engineering team can analyze your existing system data flows, assess DLP deployment scope, and provide customized rule recommendations.